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~.2~ (1988). Section 316(b) can-
not be used as a separate basis for imposing 
tax if there is no federal taxable income to 
begin with. Id. The Circuit Court for Balt-
imore City affirmed the Tax Court and 
held that Ford Motor LAnd Dev. v. Compo 
troller, 68 Md. App. 342, 511 A.2d 578, 
cert. denied, 307 Md. 596, 516 A.2d 567 
(1986) was controlling. 
Ford Motor involved a Delaware corpora-
tion involved in real estate development 
and related activities in Maryland. Ford 
sold real property, that it owned in 
Maryland, in 1978 and realized a net capi-
tal gain of close to $3,000,000 from the 
sale. However, between 1973 and 1978, 
Ford suffered overall net operating losses 
which exceeded, and offset, the 1978 capi-
tal gain. Ford realized this after it had 
already submitted its 1978 taxes and conse-
quently asked for a refund, claiming it had 
no "net income" to be taxed in Maryland. 
The Comptroller, on the other hand, 
assessed additional taxes on Ford arguing 
that Ford's capital gain was Maryland net 
income, and therefore taxable by 
Maryland under § 316(b) regardless of 
Ford's net operating losses. The Maryland 
T ax Court agreed with the Comptroller 
and affirmed his assessment. The Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City affirmed the tax 
court. On appeal, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland reversed, basing their 
decision on statutory construction. 
The court of special appeals held that a 
corporation must have a "net income" 
under § 280A(a) before the capital gains 
allocation provision of § 316(b) can apply. 
The court determined that the plain mean-
ing of "net income" for a corporation was 
its federal taxable income as governed by § 
280A. Comptroller Of The Treasury Income 
Tax Division v. A merican Satellite Corpora· 
tion, 312 Md. 543-44, 540 A.2d at 1149 
(1988) (citing Ford Motor, 68 Md. App. at 
350·351). Since § 316 provides the means of 
allocating "net income" between 
Maryland and other states, the existence of 
a "net income" is required as a prerequi-
site to using § 316. Id. 
In American Satellite Corporation, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland used a statu· 
tory construction analysis, as did the court 
of special appeals in Ford Motor, to deter-
mine that the meaning of "net income" 
was federal taxable income. American 
Satellite Corporation, 312 Md. at 544-45, 
540 A.2d at 1150. The court of appeals 
decided that the appropriate method to 
reach the definition of "net income" was 
to ascertain the legislature's intent in 
enacting the various statutes in question. 
Id. at 544, 540 A.2d at 1150. With this pro-
blem solved, the court could then deter-
mine whether § 316 modifications could 
be made even if a corporation reported no 
"net income for the year in question." Id. 
The court of appeals used the legislative 
committee reports to ascertain the legisla-
tive intent of the statutes in question. The 
committee reports clearly demonstrated 
that the purpose of the current tax law, 
which was enacted in 1967, was to signifi-
cantly restructure the earlier tax law and 
bring it into conformity with the federal 
tax scheme. Id. at 539, 540, A.2d at 1141-
As was said previously, the court of 
appeals also determined that the legislative 
intent was for the "net income" of a cor-
poration to be its federal taxable income 
plus or minus certain modifications. See 
American Satellite, 312 Md. at 545, 540 
A.2d at 1150 (citing Technical Supplement 
to the 1975 Report of the State Tax 
Reform Study Committee (Legislative 
Council Of Maryland at 145 (Feb. 1976))). 
These modifications were to be specific 
additions and/or subtractions to the feder-
al taxable income. The result of these addi-
tions and/or subtractions would be the 
corporation's "net income." The modifi-
cations which were listed in the committee 
report corresponded exactly to those mod-
ifications listed in §§ 280A(b) and (c). See. 
Id. There was no indication in the commit-
tee report that the Comptroller's position, 
namely that § 316 modifications should be 
used when a corporation reported no "net 
income," was correct. See American Satel· 
lite, 312 Md. at 545-46, 540 A.2d at 1150. 
Therefore, the Comptroller was incor-
rect in trying to read into the provisions of 
§ 280A(b) a further addition to the taxable 
base from § 316(b)(3). Id. at 546, 540 A.2d 
at 1150-51. Consequently, § 316(b) cannot 
be used unless a corporation has a "net 
income" as defined under the laws of the 
United States because there must be some-
thing to allocate in the first place. Id. at 
547, 540 A.2d at 1151. Hence, ASC only 
owed $14,229 in taxes as required by § 
280A(b) for state and local income taxes, 
and § 288(g) for personal property taxes. 
In A merican Satellite, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland concluded that the 
"net income" of a corporation is its federal 
taxable income as modified by the addition 
and/or subtraction of those items listed in 
§ 280A(b) and (c). Furthermore, the court 
determined that if a corporation has no 
taxable income because its in-state capital 
gains were offset by out·of-state losses, 
then § 316 modifications cannot be used to 
assess further additions. Therefore, § 316 
modifications can only be used when a 
corporation has a "net income." 
-Richard M. Goldberg 
United States v. Whitehead: RAILWAY 
PASSENGER'S FOURTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED BY 
CANINE SNIFF OF LUGGAGE BAS-
ED ON REASONABLE SUSPCISION 
In the consolidated appeal of United 
States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 
1988), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Forth Circuit held that the expecta-
tion of privacy of one travelling by rail-
road is substantially less than that of a 
person occupying a temporary residence, 
such as a hotel room. In addition, the court 
held that the brief exposure of the interior 
of a sleeping compartment on board a 
train to narcotics detection dogs is consti-
tutionally permissible when based on an 
articulable, reasonable suspicion that the 
contraband is contained within the occu-
pant's luggage. In so holding, the court 
affirmed the district court's ruling. 
On November 26, 1986, ten minutes 
before the departure of the morning train 
from Miami to New York City, two spe-
cial narcotics officers assigned to the 
Miami station observed the defendant, 
Whitehead, arrive at the station in a taxi. 
As he emerged from the cab, Whitehead 
carefully surveyed the station before enter-
ing. Then, carrying a sports bag and a suit-
case, he entered the station, where he paid 
$403 in cash for a one-way, first-class sleep-
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As a result of Whitehead's initial scruti-
ny of the station, the police became suspi-
cious and questioned the taxi driver and 
ticket sales agent. They discovered that 
Whitehead had been picked up at the 
DiLido Hotel, a known meeting place for 
drug traffickers, and that he purchased the 
ticket under the name "W. Tucker." 
The officers then approached and ques-
tioned Whitehead, who identified himself 
as "W. Tucker." When asked for addition-
al identification, Whitehead began to 
sweat profusely as he produced a pair of 
military dog tags. Although Whitehead 
was dressed in a business suit, he had no 
other identification. Whitehead told the 
police he was from New York and had 
been vacationing in Miami for two days, 
where he had been staying at the DiLido 
Hotel. The officers indicated to the defen-
dant that they were in the midst of a nar-
cotics investigation and requested 
permission to search his luggage. White-
head refused and boarded the train for 
New York. 
The Miami police relayed the incident to 
the Washington Amtrak police. A com-
puter search by police revealed that no one 
named "W. Tucker" had travelled by train 
from New York to Miami, and that "W. 
Tucker's" reservation on the Miami-New 
York train was made only a few hours 
before its departure. 
The next morning, an Amtrak officer 
boarded Whitehead's train in Washington 
and learned from the porter that White-
head became ill shortly after the train's 
departure from Miami, had not eaten 
much, and had left his roomette only brief-
ly. The roomette had a sliding inside lock 
and could not be locked from the outside. 
When the train arrived in Baltimore, 
other police officers and drug trained dogs 
boarded. An Amtrak officer, posing as a 
conductor checking tickets, knocked on 
Whitehead's compartment door. White-
head opened the door, and the officer iden-
tified himself as a policeman and asked 
permission to enter. Whitehead invited 
him in, whereupon the officer advised 
Whitehead of the ensuing drug investiga-
tion. Two dogs were brought into the 
roomette and alerted the police to the lug-
gage. Three kilograms of cocaine were 
found in the suitcase, and Whitehead was 
subsequently arrested. 
At trial, the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained during the 
canine sniff search was denied. In so doing, 
the court relied generally on California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), invoking the 
"vehicle exception" to the· warrant • 
requirement. Under this analysis, the trial 
court ruled that an occupant of a roomette 
has a diminished expectation of privacy as 
compared to a person occupying a tempo-
rary home, such as a hotel room. The 
lower court further determined that 
because the police had reasonably 
suspected Whitehead of criminal wrongdo-
ing, their canine investigation of his sleep-
ing compartment did not violate the 
fourth amendment. 
On appeal, Whitehead conceded that the 
exposure of this luggage in a public place 
to a trained dog was not a search for fourth 
amendment purposes United States v. 
Whitehead at 853 (citing United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983». Whitehead 
contended, however, that his luggage was 
not in a public place, but rather in a train 
compartment that was the "functional 
equivalent" of a temporary home, such as 
a hotel room. Id. at 853 (citing Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964». Based 
upon this reasoning, Whitehead argued 
that the officers could not bring trained 
canines into his roomette without a war-
rant, or at the least, probable cause. Id. at 
853. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit rejected Whitehead's 
contentions. The court found that an occu-
pant of a train roomette has a lesser expec-
tion of privacy than individuals in their 
homes or hotel rooms. 
The court of appeals relied on several 
Supreme Court cases in support of its rea-
soning. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 153 (1925) recognized a necessary dif-
ference between a search of a home or 
other dwelling where a warrant must first 
be obtained, and a search of an automobile 
for contraband. Id. at 854. The court stated 
that "[i]n the sixty years since the Carroll 
decision, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently reaffirmed that the privacy interests 
of individuals engaged in transit on public 
thoroughfares are substantially less than 
those attached to fixed dwellings." Id. at 
854 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367 (1976) and Chambers v. 
Maroney, 392 U.S. 42 (1970». 
Ready mobility and its potential for 
immediate flight, as well as the govern-
mental regulations surrounding most 
forms of public transportation has lent cre-
dence to the diminished privacy aspects of 
public transportation. Id. at 854 (citing 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985». 
In Carney, the search of a parked motor 
home in a public place was found to be 
constitutionally permissible. The Supreme 
Court held that the motor home was 
within the "automoble" or "vehicle" 
exception and that a warrant was not 
required prior to the search. Carney, 471 
U.S. 390-93. Because the motor home in 
Carney was both readily mobile and sub-
ject to governmental regulations not 
applicable to fixed dwellings, the court 
reasoned that" overriding societal interests 
of effective law enforcement justified an 
immediate search before the vehicle and its 
occupants became unavailable." Id. at 393. 
The court of appeals in Whitehead 
reasoned that the fourth amendment prin-
ciples cited in Carney clarified Whitehead's 
privacy interests. Based upon this, the 
court found that unlike the parked motor 
home in Carney, Whitehead's sleeping 
compartment was part of a train moving in 
interstate transit. The court opined that 
Whitehead was a passenger, not a resident; 
and while he could not control the train's 
direction, its movement interfered with 
the officers' ability to conduct a full fledg-
ed investigation within their jurisdictions. 
Moreover, Whitehead had the ability to 
leave the train at any stop, and unlike a 
hotel room, he could not remain on board 
once the train arrived at its destination. 
Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 854 (4th Cir. 1988). 
The court of appeals noted further that 
railroad travel is highly regulated, and that 
passengers in sleeping cars are frequently 
subject to ticket checks and other inquiries 
by railroad personnel. The court conclud-
ed that these types of intrusions, which 
necessarily reduce a passenger's privacy 
interests, were sufficient to show that train 
sleeping compartments are not "homes on 
rails," and that an onboard passenger's 
privacy expectation is not akin to a person 
in his home. Ii at 855. 
Whitehead next contended that even if 
his privacy expectation was no greater 
than that of an automobile occupant, 
probable cause must have supported the 
canine sniff search of his compartment 
under the fourth amendment principles. 
Once again the court disagreed, stating 
that given the defendant's reduced expecta-
tion of privacy, the importance of societal 
interest in effective law enforcement, and 
the minimal intrusiveness of the dog sniff, 
probable cause was not a prerequisite. Id. 
at 855. 
In support of its reasoning, the court 
stated that the fourth amendment does not 
protect people from every governmental 
intrusion of their privacy, just unreasona-
ble ones. Id. at 855 (citing place" 462 U.S. 
at 706-07). In Place, the court ruled that 
avoiding the probable cause requirement 
for warrants rested "on a balancing of the 
nature and quality of the individual's 
fourth amendment interests against the 
important of the governmental interest 
alleged to justify the intrusion." Place, 462 
U.S. at 703. Place held that a canine sniff of 
luggage was unintrusive, and the brief sei-
zure of the bags for that purpose com-
ported with the fourth amendment if there 
was an articulable, reasonable suspicion 
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that contraband was contained therein. Id. 
708-09. 
The court of appeals also relied on Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which held that 
police officers may make limited intru-
sions on an individual's personal security 
based on less than probable cause. The 
Terry court based its decision on "the ulti-
mate standard of reasonableness embodied 
in the fourth amendment," and subse-
quent decisions that found limited intru-
sions were not confined to the "stop and 
frisk" situation presented in Terry. Id. at 
856 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 699-700 (1981». 
By analogizing the decisions of Place and 
Terry to the case at bar, the court of 
appeals found that the authorities con-
ducted the dog sniff search of the defen-
dant's luggage in a manner similar to that 
in Place. The dogs' presence was prear-
ranged, Whitehead's bags were not moved, 
the train was not delayed, and the defen-
dant remained free to move about in the 
train while the search was conducted. The 
court stated in summation that the "brief 
entry of the dogs into the roomette did not 
breach the security of Whitehead's effects 
or entail a significant encroachment of this 
privacy." Id. at 856-857. 
The gravity of the governmental 
interests, the second prong of the court's 
analysis, must be shown to be "sufficiently 
substantial" in order to justify an intrusion 
on fourth amendment interests in the 
absence of probable cause. Id. The White-
head court again relied on Place, which 
identified "preventing the flow of nar-
cotics into distribution channels" by per-
mitting investigative stops of suspected 
drug couriers as a strong governmental 
interest.Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 704». 
Based upon the analysis in Place, the court 
of appeals found that the facts of White-
head likewise involved the sufficiently sub-
stantial law enforcement interest of 
intercepting and preventing drug move-
ment from source to distribution. The 
court concluded that the officers' suspi-
cions of Whitehead, the unintrusive man-
ner of their search to verify these 
suspicions, and the defendant's limited 
privacy interests as an occupant of a train 
sleeping compartment were sufficient to 
justify the dog sniff without a showing of 
probable cause. Id. at 857. 
In his final argument in support of his 
motion to suppress, Whitehead contended 
that the officers did not possess an arti-
culable, reasonable suspicion that his lug-
gage contained contraband. The court 
agreed that a reasonable suspicion was nec-
essary before the dogs could be released 
inside Whitehead's roomette. However, it 
concluded that numerous objective factors 
as set forth by the trial court concerning 
the defendant's appearance and conduct 
provided the officers with the "requisite 
quantum of suspicion." Id. at 857. These 
factors included Whitehead's presence in 
Miami, a major drug source city; his stay 
at the DiLido Hotel, a known meeting 
point for drug traffickers; his arrival at the 
train station just minutes before the train's 
departure and his scrutiny before entry; 
his decision, after only a two day vacation, 
to take a 26 hour train ride at a cost 
substantially higher than an airline ticket; 
the fact that he had not taken the train to 
Miami, at least not under the name of "W. 
Tucker"; his failure to supply his full 
name; his making the train reservation just 
hours before departure; his paying with 
cash as a means to avoid presenting identi-
fication; his lack of identification; his star-
tled, nervous appearance and profuse 
sweating in an air conditioned station; and 
the fact that he left his compartment only 
briefly probably so that he could remain 
with the luggage. The court concluded that 
the officers had a reasonable suspicion that 
Whitehead was engaged in illegal activity 
based upon the entire "mosaic" of his 
actions, and piecemeal refutation of each 
factor was not what counted. 
In dissent, Judge Murnaghan stated that 
a passenger train sleeping compartment 
was more analogous to a temporary home 
for fourth amendment purposes, and 
Whitehead's reasonable expectation of 
privacy was violated by the canine sniff 
search. Id. at 860 (citing United States v. 
Chadwick, 438 U.S. 1,7 (1977) and Katz v. 
United States, 139 U.S. 347, 361 (1967». In 
further support of his dissent, Judge Mur-
naghan found that the numerous factors 
relating to the defendants appearance and 
conduct were, even when considered in 
totality, insufficient to create a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
by Whitehead. [d. at 862 (citing United 
States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1371 (9th 
Cir. 1987) and United States v. Gooding, 
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695 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1982)).
By its decision in Whitehead, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has held that occupants of over-
night train sleeping compartments do not
have the same expectation of privacy as
individuals in their homes or hotel rooms.
Additionally, the court has stated that
where such diminished expectation exists,
the importance of the law enforcement
interests at stake and the "minimal intru-
siveness" of the search abrogate the
requirement of probable cause under the
fourth amendment. As a result of this rul-
ing, the court of appeals has not only rede-
fined the privacy interests of individuals
travelling by train, but it appears to justify
the abrogation of probable cause as a pre-
requisite to a canine sniff search for contra-
band by endorsing the use of police
profiles to establish a reasonable, arti-
culable suspicion of criminal activity.
-Virginia Marino Harasti
Mills v. Maryland: SUPREME COURT
RULES THAT MARYLAND'S CAPI-
TAL SENTENCING PROCEDURE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDA-
TORY
In Mills v. Maryland -.U.S.._ 108 S.
Ct. 1860 (1988), the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a
Maryland Court of Appeals death sentence
affirmation on the ground that the jury
verdict form used was unconstitutional.
Ralph Mills, an inmate in the Maryland
Correctional Institution, was convicted by
a jury of the first degree murder of his
cellmate, Paul Brown. At the conclusion
of the sentencing hearings, the same jury,
using the verdict form provided for in Md.
Rule Proc. 772A, found beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that an aggravating circumstance
had been proven; namely, that the "defen-
dant committed the murder at a time
when he was confined in a correctional
institution." Id at 1871. Equally impor-
tant, the jury found none of the mitigating
circumstances provided for in Rule 772A
had been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Consequently, the jury had
marked "no" beside each of the eight
mitigating circumstances listed on the ver-
dict form. Accordingly, as required by the
Maryland Capital Punishment Statute,
Md. Ann. Code, art. 27 S 413 (1987 Repl.
Vol.), the jury handed down a sentence of
death.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, petitioner argued that the sta-
tute, in conjuction with the jury instruc-
tions and the verdict form, was
unconstitutional in that jury unanimity
was required to find the presence or
absence of an aggravating circumstance,
but not required to find the absence of any
mitigating circumstances. Therefore, a sen-
tence of death could result in a situation
where the jury unanimously found an
aggravating circumstance, but could not
agree on the presence of any one specific
mitigating circumstance, even if all twelve
agreed that some mitigating factors existed.
R42 at 1865. Conversely, even if eleven of
the jurors agreed to the existence of a par-
ticular mitigating circumstance, the failure
of the remaining juror to agree to the same
circumstance may result in the jury mark-
ing the verdict form "no" in regard to that
particular circumstance.
The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, and concluded that the requirement
of unanimity imposed by the statute
applied not only to a finding of the exist-
ence of a particular mitigating cir-
cumstance, but also to a finding of the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.
The Court found that the verdict form
should be read as requiring unanimity for
"no" answers as well as "yes" answers.
Furthermore, they found that the trial
judge's instructions to the jury stressed the
need for unanimity on all of the issues pre-
sented. Id at 1864. Therefore, the Court
concluded that a finding by any one juror
of a mitigating circumstance was sufficient
to compel the jury to weigh this factor
against any aggravating circumstance.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cognized, however, that the statute did not
provide a procedure to be followed when
unanimity could not be reached. Thus,
pursuant to its authority to fill gaps in the
sentencing process, as provided by 5
413(1), they directed that if the jury could
not agree unanimously on the acceptance
or rejection of any mitigating cir-
cumstances, it should leave that answer
blank and proceed to the balancing phase.
R41 at 1864.
The Supreme Court initially noted the
importance of mitigating factors in capital
cases, stating that "the sentencer may not
refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering any relevant evidence."
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
With this proposistion in mind, the Court
proceeded to analyze "whether petition-
er's interpretation of the sentencing pro-
cess is one a reasonable jury could have
drawn from the instructions given by the
trial judge and from the verdict form
employed in this case." Mils at 1866.
The strength of Mill's argument rested
on the possibility that alternate grounds
existed for the sentence of death. If the
jury adopted the interpretation favored by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, then it
only marked "no" on the verdict form
when all twelve of the jurors agreed that
the mitigating circumstances were not pro-
ved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id Conversely, if the jury adopted the
approach advanced by the petitioner, then
the marking of "no", only indicated a fail-
ure to unanimously agree to the existence
of a particular mitigating circumstance.
Thus, the jury would be precluded from
considering mitigating factors that some
jurors found to exist. The Supreme Court
said, "[U]nless we can rule out the substan-
tial possibility that the jury may have
rested its verdict on the 'improper'
ground, we must remand for resentenc-
ing." Id at 1867.
They decided that the two crucial fac-
tors to be considered were the judge's
instructions to the jury regarding the ver-
dict form stipulated by Md. Rule Proc.
772A, and the verdict form itself. Regard-
ing the jury instructions, the Court found
that while the trial judge repeatedly stress-
ed the need for unanimity concerning the
finding of both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, he failed to stress that the
answer of "no" to either one also required
a unanimous finding. Thus, the Court
determined that it was possible that the
jury made the inference that the "no"
answer is merely a failure to unanimously
agree on the existence of a particular cir-
cumstance, either aggravating or
mitigating, not a unanimous finding that
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